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TIME FOR CHANGE: MARYLAND'S INADEQUATE 
TREATMENT OF ALTERNATE JURORS AND THE FEDERAL 
SOLUTION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are suffering from terminal cancer. 1 Although your 
life expectancy is reduced to mere months, you bravely endure a jury 
trial in an effort to recover damages from the doctor who you believe 
misdiagnosed your malignant tumor. 2 After days of waiting, the jury 
returns a verdict in your favor and you feel a sense of peace knowing 
that your children and grandchildren will be financially secure after 
your death. 3 To your disappointment, the verdict is appealed because 
of a procedural error in which the alternate jurors were not dismissed, 
as required by the Maryland Rules, but rather were present in the jury 
room during deliberations and then substituted for regular jurors. 4 As 
your health continues to deteriorate, you suffer through months of 
agonizing waiting as your case is brought before the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland. Unfortunately, the appellate court reverses the 
trial court's verdict because of the court's mistreatment of the 
alternate jurors. 5 You are back at square one and are faced with a 
new trial, which seems like an insurmountable task given your 
current health. 6 
1. See generally Brockington v. Grimstead, 176 Md. App. 327, 933 A.2d 426 (Ct. Spec. 
App. 2007), cert. granted, 403 Md. 304, 941 A.2d 1104 (2008). 
2. /d. 
3. See New Trial Ordered in $1.9 Million City Malpractice Case: Appeals Court Faults 
Trial Judge in Use of Alternate Jurors, BALT. SUN, Sept. 8, 2007, at 5B. After an 
eight-day trial, a Baltimore city jury awarded $4.4 million to Joyce Grimstead. !d. 
Baltimore City Circuit Judge Thomas Noel reduced the judgment to $1.9 million after 
applying Maryland's state malpractice caps. /d. 
4. See Brockington, 176 Md. App. at 341, 933 A.2d at 433-34. 
5. See id at 364, 933 A.2d at 447. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland concluded 
that "[t]he trial court committed legal error by substituting the alternate jurors for two 
regular jurors during deliberations," and that the remedy is reversal of judgment and a 
new trial. /d. 
6. See Nicole Fuller, Malpractice Suit Plaintiff Is Awarded $4.4 Million: Cancer Was 
Misdiagnosed, Woman Says, BALT. SUN, Nov. 17, 2005, at 4B. After the jury trial, 
Grimstead stated that she is still undergoing chemotherapy but has been told that she 
will likely die soon. !d. 
203 
204 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 38 
This devastating sequence of events is the reality that Maryland 
resident Joyce Grimstead recently faced. 7 Her already painful 
disease was further worsened by Maryland's inadequate treatment of 
alternate jurors. Joyce Grimstead's unfortunate ordeal must serve as 
a "wake-up call" to the Maryland Legislature and the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland to reform the Maryland Rules. 
This Comment will advocate for change to Maryland's policies 
regarding alternate jurors by illustrating that the current rules do not 
work and are in desperate need of reform. Part II will outline the 
relevant law that provides the right to a jury trial in both civil and 
criminal cases. Part III will lay the foundation regarding the use of 
alternate jurors and specifically discuss Maryland's treatment of 
alternate jurors. Next, through a thorough analysis of the 
Brockington v. Grimstead decision in Part IV, this Comment will 
highlight the unworkable nature of the Maryland Rules. Part V will 
expand on the inadequacies of the Maryland Rules, discussed in Part 
IV, and specifically address the negative effects of the inadequate 
rules on clients, judges, jurors, and alternate jurors. Part VI will 
explore the federal reforms to the alternate juror process both in the 
criminal and civil systems, which have served as the basis for 
Maryland's unsuccessful efforts at alternate juror reform, which are 
discussed in Part VII. Lastly, in Part VIII, this Comment will make 
practical recommendations for reform that attempt to strike a balance 
between promoting judicial economy and preserving the sanctity of 
jury deliberations. 
II. THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL 
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees the right 
to a jury trial in criminal proceedings. 8 This right is made applicable 
to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 9 In conjunction with the Constitution, the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights further protects the right to a jury trial in all 
criminal proceedings. 10 
7. See generally Brockington, 176 Md. App. 327, 933 A.2d 426 (2007), cert. granted, 
403 Md. 304, 941 A.2d 1104 (2008) (finding that the substitution of alternate jurors 
for regular jurors after jury deliberations had begun constituted reversible error and 
entitled the defendant to a new trial). 
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This right has been modified to extend to crimes where 
the maximum penalty exceeds six months. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 
69 (1970). 
9. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968). 
10. See Stokes v. State, 379 Md. 618, 625-26, 843 A.2d 64, 68 (2004) (exploring the 
origins of the right to a jury trial). 
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The right to be judged by a jury of one's peers is not a right 
possessed only by the criminally accused, but rather, civil litigants 
can also demand a jury trial when certain criteria are met. 11 The 
Seventh Amendment of the Constitution, which affords civil litigants 
the right to a jury trial, is applicable in federal courts "[i]n suits at 
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars." 12 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has '"consistently held 
that the Seventh Amendment is not incorporated into the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and consequently is not applicable to state court 
proceedings,"' 13 nearly every state constitution ensures the right to 
trial by jury in civil cases. 14 
In Maryland, the civil litigant's right to a jury trial is established in 
Articles 5 and 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which is 
found in the Maryland constitution. 15 Article 5 preserves the right to 
trial by jury for cases in which a jury trial rightfully could have been 
demanded at English Common Law 16 and Article 23 ensures this 
right when the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. 17 Both the 
Maryland Code 18 and the Maryland Rules mandate that the civil jury 
consist of six jurors but do allow a verdict of less than six to be 
accepted with the agreement ofboth parties and the court. 19 
III. THE ROLE OF ALTERNATE JURORS 
A. Benefits of Impanelling Alternate Jurors 
Many states, including Maryland, and the federal criminal system 
impanel additional jurors who serve as "alternates."20 Alternate 
jurors replace a seated juror during the trial if a member of the jury 
becomes ill or incapacitated for any reason. 21 Some states even allow 
alternate jurors to replace seated jurors after deliberations have 
11. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
12. /d. 
13. Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599,617 n.l2, 861 A.2d 78, 89 n.l2 (2004) (quoting Bringe 
v. Collins, 274 Md. 338, 341, 335 A.2d 670, 673 (1975)). 
14. See Charles A. Rees, Preserved or Pickled?: The Right to Trial by Jury After the 
Merger of Law and Equity in Maryland, 26 U. BALT. L. REv. 301, 350 (1997). 
15. Mo. CoNST., Declaration of Rights, arts. 5(b), 23. 
16. See id. art. 5(a)-(b). 
17. /d. art. 23. 
18. See Mo. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-42l(b) (LexisNexis 2007). 
19. See MD. R. 2-Sll(b). 
20. See Valeree D. Marek, Comment, The Silent Alternate Juror: A Violation of the 
Constitutional Right to Trial by Jury?, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 765, 769-70 (1982). 
21. See id. 
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commenced. 22 The use of alternate jurors enables judges to avoid 
declaring a mistrial, which wastes valuable judicial and client 
resources. 23 This waste of time and money could not be avoided at 
common law, when courts were required to declare a mistrial if a 
juror became unable to continue service during the trial. 24 
B. Maryland's Treatment of Alternate Jurors 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted Maryland Rule 2-512 
and its criminal counterpart Maryland Rule 4-312 to address the 
selection, substitution, and discharge of alternate jurors. 25 Both rules 
require that alternate jurors "be drawn in the same manner, have the 
same qualifications, be subject to the same examination" as seated 
jurors. 26 Until discharged from service, alternates serve the same 
functions and possess the same privileges as seated jurors. 27 The 
similarities between the alternates and the seated jurors allow for a 
seamless substitution should it occur during the trial. 28 
22. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 18.5(h); WASH. R. CRIM. P. 6.5; IDAHO R. CRJM. P. 
24(d)(2). Many states, including Maryland, do not allow substitution of alternates 
after the jury retires to deliberate because of concerns regarding the sanctity of jury 
deliberations. See MD. R. 4-312. 
23. See People v. Collins, 552 P.2d 742, 745 (Cal. 1976). 
24. See James v. State, 14 Md. App. 689, 699-700, 288 A.2d 644, 650 (Ct. Spec. App. 
1972) (explaining that, at common law, when a juror became unable to continue 
service during a trial, whether because of the death, illness, or misconduct of a juror or 
other cause necessitating his discharge, the practice was to discharge the entire jury 
and begin de novo by forming a new jury panel). 
25. See MD. R. 2-512, 4-312. Both rules address when alternate jurors must be discharged 
and when alternates can replace seated jurors. The rules are similar in all pertinent 
ways except that Maryland Rule 2-512 applies in the civil context while Maryland 
Rule 4-312 applies in criminal cases. See Brockington v. Grimstead, 176 Md. App. 
327, 344, 933 A.2d 426, 434 (Ct. Spec. App. 2007). 
26. See MD. R. 2-512(b), 4-312(b). 
27. See Stokes v. State, 379 Md. 618, 633, 843 A.2d 64, 73 (2004) (explaining that 
alternates are selected in the same manner as regular jurors, subjected to the same voir 
dire and tests of impartiality, and hear the same evidence, jury instructions, and 
closing arguments). 
28. See American Judicature Society, Use of Alternate Jurors, 
http://www.ajs.org/jc/juries/jc_decision_alternate.asp (last visited Feb. 22, 2008). 
See id. 
Pre-submission substitution usually raises no major issues. This is 
because the jurors have been instructed in almost every 
jurisdiction that they are not to discuss the case among themselves 
before they have retired to deliberate. Thus, there is really no 
difference between regular and alternate jurors before the jury 
retires to deliberate. 
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1. When Substitution of Alternate Jurors Can Occur in Maryland 
Unlike some states, which allow for the substitution of alternates 
after the jury has commenced deliberations, 29 the Maryland Rules 
forbid this practice. 30 Pursuant to the Maryland Rules, "[w]hen the 
jury retires to consider its verdict, the trial judge shall discharge any 
remaining alternates who did not replace another jury member."31 
The use of the word "shall" indicates a mandatory provision, and the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland "has with increasing rigidity" applied 
this principle in statutory interpretation. 32 
2. Hayes v. State 
In 1999, the Court of Appeals of Maryland specifically interpreted 
"when the jury retires to consider its verdict" in order to determine 
the exact time when alternate jurors must be dismissed in accordance 
with the Maryland Rules and the point at which they can no longer 
replace a seated juror.33 In Hayes v. State, 34 the court replaced a 
seated juror with an alternate juror, after the original jury had gone 
into the deliberation room to begin discussions. 35 The court of 
appeals held that "the closing of the [jury] door" is the point when the 
jury retires to consider its verdict and the point at which deliberations 
have commenced. 36 After this point, the substitution of an alternate 
juror is no longer permitted. 37 The court of appeals reasoned that this 
standard is practical because "compliance with it can be established 
through objective and extrinsic evidence, without the need to 
question jurors as to what went on in the jury room after the door was 
closed."38 If a substitution occurs after the closing of jury doors, as 
29. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
30. See Stokes. 379 Md. at 629, 843 A.2d at 70. 
31. Mo. R. 2-512(f)(3), 4-312(f)(3). 
32. Pope v. Sec'y ofPers., 46 Md. App. 716,717,420 A.2d 1017, 1018 (Ct. Spec. App. 
1980). 
33. See Hayes v. State, 355 Md. 615, 622, 735 A.2d 1109, 1112-13 (1999). Since the 
Hayes decision, the organization of the Maryland Rules has changed, but the same 
mandatory language regarding the substitution and discharge of alternate jurors is 
present. See Mo. R. 2-512 (amended 2007); see also Mo. R. 4-312 (amended 2007). 
34. 355 Md. 615, 735 A.2d 1109 (1999). 
35. See id. at 618, 735 A.2d at 1110. One of the seated jurors became ill after the jury 
went into the deliberation room. The trial judge then replaced this juror with an 
alternate, who had been dismissed but had not left the courthouse. Jd. 
36. Jd. at 635, 735 A.2d at 1120. 
37. Jd. 
38. Id. at 636, 735 A.2d at 1120. 
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in Hayes, prejudice to the defendant is presumed and reversal is 
required, 39 unless the State rebuts the presumption. 40 
3. Stokes v. State 
In 2004, the Court of Appeals of Maryland once again analyzed the 
Maryland Rules regarding alternate jurors and addressed the harm 
that results when alternate jurors are present in the jury room during 
deliberations. 41 The Stokes court specifically analyzed the harm that 
resulted when four alternate jurors were present in the jury room and 
observed the deliberations in violation of Maryland Rule 4-
312(£)(3).42 The court of appeals held that "[t]he presence of 
alternate jurors [in the jury room] who have no legal standing as 
jurors injects an improper outside influence on jury deliberations and 
impairs the integrity of the jury trial,"43 and consequently invades the 
privacy, impartiality, and secrecy of the jury room. 44 The presence of 
alternates in the jury room further harms the jury process by creating 
a lack of accountability for the alternate jurors who are able to 
influence other jury members while having no responsibility 
regarding the outcome of the case. 45 
According to Stokes, the presence of alternates impinges "upon the 
defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the 
Maryland [ c ]onstitution and Maryland Rules of Procedure to create a 
presumption of prejudice."46 The presumption of prejudice can only 
be rebutted by an affirmative showing that the presence of the 
alternates did not or could not have caused prejudice. 47 Rebutting 
this presumption is an almost impossible task because Maryland Rule 
5-606(b) forbids any inquiry "into the proceedings inside the jury 
39. Stokes v. State, 379 Md. 618, 636, 843 A.2d 64, 75 (2004). 
40. See id. at 641-42, 843 A.2d at 78. 
41. See id. at 634, 843 A.2d at 73. 
42. !d. at 624, 843 A.2d at 67. Although the specific Maryland Rule was numerically 
different during the Stokes decision, the substance of the rule remains identical today. 
See Mo. R. 4-312 (amended 2007). 
43. Stokes, 379 Md. at 638, 843 A.2d at 76. 
44. !d. at 634, 843 A.2d at 73. 
45. !d. 
46. !d. at 638, 843 A.2d at 75. The presumption of prejudice avoids specific inquiry into 
the "sanctified space of the jury room to determine what impact the presence of 
alternates had on the outcome of deliberations.'' Brockington v. Grimstead, 176 Md. 
App. 327, 363, 933 A.2d 426, 447 (Ct. Spec. App. 2007). Also, presuming prejudice 
to the defendant recognizes that once deliberations have commenced, the six jurors 
become a joint body and inserting new members midstream would have an effect on 
the unit. !d. 
47. See Stokes, 379 Md. at 641, 843 A.2d at 78. 
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room or into the juror's mental processes .... "48 If the prejudice is 
not rebutted, reversal is required and the defendant is entitled to a 
new trial. 49 
Similar to Maryland courts, "almost every court" throughout the 
nation considers the presence of alternate jurors in the jury room to 
be error. 50 However, courts in various jurisdictions differ as to the 
remedy afforded when this error occurs. 51 A majority of courts adopt 
the same view as Maryland courts and presume prejudice when 
alternates breach the sanctity of the jury room. 52 Courts in other 
jurisdictions go beyond the presumption of prejudice approach and 
adopt the reversible error per se approach. 53 In these courts, the 
presence of an alternate in the jury room during deliberations will 
automatically "void the trial."54 Courts adopting the reversible error 
per se approach, as well as courts in jurisdictions such as Maryland 
where prejudice is presumed, represent the majority viewpoint that 
the presence of alternate jurors in the jury room is an error. 55 
IV. BROCKINGTONv. GRIMSTEAD 
A. Trial Court 
Brockington v. Grimstead illustrates the obstacles and conflicts that 
the current alternate juror rules create at both trial court and appellate 
court levels. 56 This case originated in the Baltimore City Circuit 
48. Id. at 641-42, 843 A.2d at 78; see also Mo. R. 5-606 ("[A] sworn juror may not 
testify as to ... the jury's deliberations ... [or] the sworn juror's mental processes in 
connection with the verdict."). Public policy forbids any inquiry into the juror's 
mental process and deliberations because it destroys the secrecy and sanctity of juror 
deliberations. See Stokes, 379 Md. at 637, 843 A.2d at 75. 
49. Stokes, 379 Md. at 642, 843 A.2d at 78 (holding that the presumption of prejudice to 
the defendant was not overcome; therefore, reversal is mandated and the case must be 
remanded for a new trial). 
50. !d. at 634, 843 A.2d at 73. 
51. !d. 
52. See, e.g., State v. Crandall, 452 N.W.2d 708 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); Falcon v. State, 
874 P.2d 772 (Nev. 1994); Jones v. Sisters of Providence in Wash., Inc., 970 P.2d 371 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1999). 
53. See, e.g., Bouey v. State, 762 So. 2d 537, 539-40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 531 N.E.2d 556, 560-61 (Mass. 1988); State v. Bindyke, 
220 S.E.2d 521,533 (N.C. 1975). 
54. Bindyke, 220 S.E.2d at 533; see also Bouey, 762 So. 2d at 539; Smith, 531 N.E.2d at 
560-61. 
55. See Stokes, 379 Md. at 633-37, 843 A.2d at 73-75. 
56. Brockington v. Grimstead, 176 Md. App. 327, 331-41, 933 A.2d 426, 428-33 (Ct. 
Spec. App. 2007). 
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Court when Joyce Grimstead filed a complaint "alleging that [Dr. 
McNeal Brockington] negligently failed to diagnose and [failed to] 
treat her cancer ... during the five-year period [when] he was her 
primary care physician."57 Mrs. Grimstead "prayed a jury trial."58 
"After voir dire, but before selection of the jury," the circuit court 
asked counsel for both sides if "they would consent to a verdict [of] 
five jurors," if circumstances occurred in which one juror was unable 
to continue service until the verdict. 59 While Mrs. Grimstead 
consented to this practice, Dr. Brockington required the verdict to be 
from six jurors. 60 The jury consisted of six regular jurors and two 
alternate jurors. 61 
Nine days after the start of the trial and after closing arguments, the 
jury recessed for the evening to begin deliberations the next day. 62 In 
the jurors' absence, the circuit court announced its plan to send the 
two alternates into the jury room to observe deliberations, but not 
participate. 63 The court viewed this practice as a safeguard against a 
mistrial if one of the jurors became unable to continue jury service 
during the course of deliberations and found it especially relevant in 
this situation because Dr. Brockington would not accept a verdict of 
less than six jurors. 64 Dr. Brockington did not object to this practice 
but rather consented to the alternates' presence in the jury room. 65 
Although Mrs. Grimstead objected to this practice, the court decided 
that the alternates would be present in the jury room unless she could 
produce authority supporting her objection. 66 
57. I d. at 331, 933 A.2d at 428. 
58. Id. 
59. I d. Although a jury must consist of six persons, "[w]ith the approval of the court, the 
parties may agree to accept a verdict from fewer than six jurors if during the trial one 
or more of the six jurors becomes or is found to be unable or disqualified to perform a 
juror's duty." Mo. R. 2-511 (b). 
60. See Brockington, 176 Md. App. at 331, 933 A.2d at 428. 
61. Id. at 333, 933 A.2d at 429. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 333, 335-36, 933 A.2d at 429-30. The trial judge explained that he had done 
this in the past and that he did not "'see where there [was] any harm' in the alternate 
jurors' listening to, but not participating in, the deliberations until such time as it 
might become necessary to substitute them." Id. at 335, 933 A.2d at 430 (alteration in 
original). 
65. Id. at 334-35, 933 A.2d at 430. Brockington's counsel specifically responded to the 
trial judge's suggestion to have the alternates in the jury room, "Your Honor, I think 
the last trial [before you], which finished two weeks ago, we did the same thing, Your 
Honor suggested. I didn't object then. I don't object now." Id. (alteration in 
original). 
66. Id. at 333-34, 933 A.2d at 429. 
2008] Alternate Jurors 211 
The following day, the jury returned for the first day of 
deliberations. 67 Due to time constraints, counsel for Mrs. Grimstead 
did not produce authority supporting her previous objection so the 
court allowed the alternates to observe deliberations. 68 In an effort to 
assure Mrs. Grimstead and Dr. Brockington that this practice would 
not prejudice the deliberations, the court instructed the two alternate 
jurors to remain as "neutral as possible" while observing the 
deliberations. 69 Following the court's instruction, the jurors, 
including the two alternates, retired to the jury room to begin 
deliberations. 70 
During the first day of deliberations, the jury informed the court 
that they were deadlocked at three and three, 71 and they remained 
unable to reach a verdict at the end of the first day of deliberations. 72 
The court decided that the jury would continue deliberations after the 
Friday holiday and reconvene the following Monday morning. 73 
Before the Monday morning proceedings began, juror number four 
presented a letter from his doctor to the court asking to be excused 
from service. 74 Dr. Brockington objected to dismissing this juror at 
this stage of deliberations because it would be extremely prejudicial 
to disturb the dynamics of a deadlocked jury.75 In the alternative, 
Mrs. Grimstead reasoned that this was an ideal time to substitute 
juror number four with one of the alternate jurors, both of whom 
were still present in the jury room. 76 The court decided that the juror 
would deliberate for the day and at the end of the day's deliberations 
it would determine whether to dismiss him for medical reasons. 77 
After several hours of deliberating on day two, the jury was still 
deadlocked at three to three, and Dr. Brockington asked the court to 
declare a hung jury if the jury did not reach a verdict by the end of 
67. !d. at 334, 336, 933 A.2d at 429-30. 
68. !d. at 334-35, 933 A.2d at 429-30. 
69. !d. at 335-36, 933 A.2d at 430. According to the trial judge, remaining as neutral as 
possible involved the alternate jurors not making any facial or body expressions and 
not reflecting how they felt about anything that was said in the deliberation room. !d. 
70. !d. 
71. !d. at 336, 933 A.2d at 430-31. 
72. See id. At this point, Dr. Brockington, through his counsel, was prepared to move for 
a mistrial due to the deadlocked jury. !d. at 336, 933 A.2d at 430. 
73. !d. at 336, 933 A.2d at 431. 
74. !d. In the letter, the doctor informed the court that juror number four had a "damaged 
heart" and should not be serving on the jury at all. !d. 
75. !d. at 336-37, 933 A.2d at 431. 
76. See id. at 335, 337, 933 A.2d at 430-31. 
77. See id. at 336-37,933 A.2d at43l. 
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the day's deliberations. 78 Although he did not initially object to the 
alternates' presence in the jury room, Dr. Brockington then objected 
to the presence of the alternates in the jury room and to the possible 
substitution of juror number four, the juror with the medical note, 
with one of the alternates. 79 Dr. Brockington relied on Maryland 
Rule 2-512(f)(3), 80 which requires the dismissal of alternate jurors 
before the jury retires to deliberate, 81 and the court of appeals' 
decision in Stokes v. State. 82 The circuit court denied the motion for 
a mistrial and "asserted that it had [fully] complied with Stokes by 
instructing the alternate jurors not to participate in the 
deliberations. "83 With the jury still deadlocked, the court then 
dismissed juror number four for medical reasons. 84 
The next day, which was the third day of deliberations, the court 
once again received a doctor's note from one of the seated jurors. 85 
Following the doctor's excuse, the court dismissed juror number five 
for medical reasons. 86 The court then replaced jurors four and five 
with the two alternate jurors. 87 With the alternates now serving as 
seated jurors, the jury resumed deliberations. 88 
When the substitutions occurred, Dr. Brockington objected to the 
dismissal of the seated jurors and to the substitution of the alternate 
jurors. 89 Dr. Brockington once more directed the court to Stokes and 
additionally referred it to Hayes v. State. 90 On November 15, 2005, 
the jury reached a verdict. 91 Finding that Dr. Brockington was 
negligent in his care and treatment of Mrs. Grimstead, the jury ruled 
in favor of Mrs. Grimstead. 92 
78. /d. at 337, 933 A.2d at 431. 
79. !d. at 338, 933 A.2d at 432. 
80. Jd. Maryland Rule 2-512(b) is now encompassed in Maryland Rule 2-512(f)(3). 
81. Mo. R. 2-512(b). 
82. 379 Md. 618, 843 A.2d 64 (2004). For a discussion of Stokes v. State see supra Part 
III.B.3. 
83. Brockington, 176 Md. App. at 339, 933 A.2d at 432. 
84. /d. 
85. Jd. The note was from juror number five's doctor and simply said that he would be 
unable to serve on the jury for the next two days. !d. 
86. See id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. "The court did not instruct the jurors about the process they should follow, i.e., 
whether they should start deliberating anew or pick up deliberations where the 
original jury had left off." !d. at 339, 933 A.2d at 432-33. 
89. Jd. at 339, 933 A.2d at 433. 
90. !d. at 338-40, 933 A.2d at 432-33. 
91. Id. at 340, 933 A.2d at 433. 
92. See id. at 341, 933 A.2d at 433. 
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B. Appellate Review in the Court of Special of Appeals 
Dr. Brockington appealed on the grounds that the trial court erred 
as a matter of law when it allowed alternate jurors to be present in the 
jury room, instead of discharging them when the jury retired to 
deliberate. 93 Dr. Brockington asserted that the court further erred 
when it substituted the alternates for seated jurors, in violation of the 
Maryland Rules. 94 In response to this appeal, Mrs. Grimstead 
asserted that Dr. Brockington consented to the alternates' presence in 
the jury room and therefore could not attack their subsequent 
substitution on appeal, because that was the purpose of their 
continued presence in the jury room. 95 Because of this consent, Mrs. 
Grimstead maintained that Dr. Brockington waived the right to 
advance his arguments on appeal. 96 Dr. Brockington countered this 
argument by asserting that he never consented to waiving the 
requirements of Maryland Rule 2-512(f)(3),97 and that he timely 
objected to the substitution of the alternates. 98 
After analyzing the pertinent law in Maryland regarding alternate 
jurors and waiver, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed 
the trial court's decision in favor of Mrs. Grimstead and remanded 
the case for a new trial. 99 The court of special appeals began by 
applying the principles of Stokes and Hayes and concluded that both 
cases mandate that prejudice to Dr. Brockington be presumed by the 
presence and participation of the alternates in the jury room, which 
destroyed the sanctity of the deliberations. 100 The appellate court 
held that the circuit court did not have the authority to ignore the 
Maryland Rules and the mandate of Stokes and Hayes and 
consequently erred when it did so. 101 
Although Hayes and Stokes mandate that prejudice to Dr. 
Brockington be presumed from the presence and substitution of the 
alternates in violation of the Maryland Rules, the court of special 
appeals recognized that actual prejudice to Dr. Brockington 
93. !d. 
94. !d. 
95. !d. at 341--42, 933 A.2d at 434. 
96. !d. 
97. Maryland Rule 2-512(f)(3) states: "When the jury retires to consider its verdict, the 
trial judge shall discharge any remaining alternates who did not replace another jury 
member." 
98. See Brockington, 176 Md. App. at 342, 933 A.2d at 434. 
99. !d. at 364-65, 933 A.2d at 447. 
100. !d. at 363, 933 A.2d at 446--47. 
101. !d. 
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resulted. 102 The late substitution of the alternates changed the 
delicate dynamics of a hung jury, which ultimately led to the verdict 
against Dr. Brockington. 103 Moreover, when the alternates joined the 
jury, the trial court gave no instruction for the jury to begin 
deliberations anew. 104 The substitution of the alternates also deprived 
Dr. Brockington of other available remedies, such as the granting of a 
mistrial, which was an appropriate remedy given that the jury was 
deadlocked. 105 
The court of special appeals thoroughly entertained Mrs. 
Grimstead's waiver argument and concluded that Dr. Brockington 
was not precluded from advancing his arguments on appeal. 106 
Although the court of appeals has never expressly ruled that the 
requirements of Maryland Rule 2-512(f)(3) are waivable, the court of 
special appeals assumed that the requirements can be waived in their 
analysis. 107 The court of special appeals acknowledged that Dr. 
Brockington expressly consented to the presence of the alternate 
jurors in the jury room in violation of the Maryland Rules and 
therefore implicitly consented to their substitution during 
deliberations. 108 However, Dr. Brockington announced, prior to the 
substitution of the alternates, that he was no longer consenting to the 
jury deliberation process, which included the substitution of the 
alternate jurors in violation of the Maryland Rules. 109 At a minimum, 
this announcement was an effective retraction of his previous consent 
to permit the substitution of alternate jurors, and occurred before any 
substitution took place. 110 Additionally, after this retraction, Dr. 
Brockington timely objected to the substitution of the alternate jurors 
in violation of the Maryland Rules. 111 Consequently, Dr. 
102. /d. at 364,933 A.2d at 447. 
103. /d. 
!d. 
104. !d. 
105. See id. 
For more than I 0 hours over the course of 2 days (with a three-
day holiday weekend in the middle), the jury deliberated without 
reaching verdict. ... Three hours and 37 minutes after the 
substitution of the two alternates, the jury reached a verdict. The 
inference is strong, from the timing of events, that the change in 
the composition of the jury mid-deliberations caused a change in 
the outcome of the case, to Brockington's prejudice. 
I 06. See id. at 362, 933 A.2d at 446. 
107. See id. 
I 08. See id. at 353-54, 933 A.2d at 441. 
I 09. See id. at 353, 360, 933 A.2d at 440-41, 444-45. 
II 0. See id. at 358-59, 933 A.2d at 444. 
Ill. See id. at 354, 933 A.2d at 441. 
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Brockington was not precluded from challenging the substitution of 
alternate jurors on appeal. 112 
The court of special appeals recognized the trial court's interest in 
"averting a mistrial due to a hung jury after a long and complex 
trial." 113 However, the court emphasized that "[a]ny remedy to this 
problem ... must comport with the Maryland Rules." 114 The court 
further emphasized that until the Maryland Rules are changed by 
amendment or by legislative action, alternate jurors may not 
participate in jury deliberations in any capacity. 115 
V. SHORTCOMINGS WITH MARYLAND'S TREATMENT OF 
ALTERNATE JURORS 
As seen in Brockington, the Maryland Rules fail when a seated 
juror becomes unable to continue service during deliberations or 
specifically anytime after the jury retires to deliberate. 116 When this 
occurs, a mistrial must be declared, 117 and considerable time, effort, 
and money is wasted, which defeats the entire purpose of the 
alternate juror system. 118 Aside from the wasted resources, there is 
substantial human cost that results from experiencing a lengthy trial 
that results in a mistrial. 119 It is illogical that the Maryland Rules 
only provide for the substitution of an alternate juror during the trial 
when it is just as likely that a seated juror would become unable to 
continue service during deliberations. 120 
The unworkable nature of the rules puts trial judges in difficult 
situations because they want to take proactive measures to prevent 
112. See id. at 362, 933 A.2d at 446. 
113. See id. at 364, 933 A.2d at 447. 
114. /d. 
115. /d. 
116. See Hayes v. State, 355 Md. 615, 635-38, 735 A.2d 1109, 1120--21 (1999) (holding 
that it was reversible error under the Maryland Rules to permit substitution of an 
alternate juror once jurors entered the room and closed the door to commence 
deliberations), rev'g 123 Md. App. 588,720 A.2d 6 (Ct. Spec. App. 1998). 
117. However, a mistrial does not have to be declared if the parties agree to accept a 
verdict from less than the required amount of jurors. See MD. R. 2-511 (b); see also 
MD. R. 4-3ll(b). 
118. See Marek, supra note 20, at 796. The purpose of the alternate juror system is to 
"provide a substitute, should one of the regular jurors become ill or incapacitated, so 
as to prevent the multitude of mistrials experienced at common law." !d. 
119. See id. 
120. See id.; see also MD. R. 2-512(b), 4-312(b) (demonstrating that the Maryland Rules 
are in accord with an alternate juror system that only allows substitutions before the 
jury retires to deliberate). 
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mistrials but cannot do so without violating the Maryland Rules. 121 
Trial courts throughout the nation have attempted to carve out 
exceptions to the mandatory dismissal of alternates when the jury 
retires to deliberate and have allowed post-submission substitution of 
alternates during deliberations. 122 These late substitutions "endanger 
the defendant's substantive right to a trial by an impartial jury and 
compromise the sanctity and freedom of the deliberation process." 123 
Moreover, Maryland jurisprudenc;e "has zealously guarded against 
intrusions into the jury room and jury deliberations" and against any 
efforts by the trial judge that would compromise the sanctity of jury 
deliberations, such as allowing the alternate jurors to be present in the 
jury room or substituted after the jury retires to deliberate, which 
could prejudice the defendant. 124 This prejudice will likely result in 
reversible error unless it can be rebutted. 125 When trial judges take 
such action, costly appeals result, such as in Brockington, and 
appellate courts are forced to analyze if the presumed prejudice to the 
defendant has been rebutted. 126 Appellate courts must also evaluate if 
the defendant consented to the presence of the alternates in the jury 
room and therefore consented to the prejudice that their presence 
caused. 127 These appeals, like mistrials, waste valuable judicial 
resources and time. Additionally, clients are forced to face further 
litigation, and their lives are once again disrupted. These judicial and 
human costs result even though the trial judge likely violated the 
Maryland Rules in an effort to guard against a mistrial. 128 
121. See Brockington v. Grimstead, 176 Md. App. 327, 335, 363-64, 933 A.2d 426, 430, 
446-47 (Ct. Spec. App. 2007). The trial judge in this case admitted that he violated 
the Maryland Rules by allowing alternates to be present in the jury room, with some 
regularity, in an effort to prevent mistrials. See id. at 335, 933 A.2d at 430. 
122. See Douglas J. McDermott, Note, Substitution of Alternate Jurors During 
Deliberations and Implications on the Rights of Litigants: The Reginald Denny Trial, 
35 B.C. L. REv. 847, 853-61 (1994) (discussing the approaches taken by several 
federal district courts). 
123. See id. at 882. 
124. See Stokes v. State, 379 Md. 618,633,638, 843 A.2d 64, 72,76 (2004). 
125. See id. at 642, 843 A.2d at 78. 
126. See id. at 631-32,843 A.2d at 72; Brockington, 176 Md. App. at 330--31,933 A.2d at 
427-28. 
127. See Brockington, 127 Md. App. at 341-42,933 A.2d at 433-34. The issue of waiver 
and if counsel consented to the presence of the alternates in the jury room should not 
be a determinative factor for appellate review. Lawyers are advocates for their clients 
and would be persuaded to consent to a procedure that would allow alternates to be in 
the jury room or improperly substituted if they thought that the alternates would 
identify with their client's position. See id. at 361, 933 A.2d at 445. 
128. See id. at 335, 933 A.2d at 430. The trial judge explained that his reason for allowing 
the alternates in the jury room to listen but not to deliberate was a proactive measure 
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Maryland's treatment of alternate jurors is also negatively affecting 
the citizens who are called to serve as alternates. 129 The selected 
alternates "may suffer high emotional and financial costs, as well as 
the burden of lost time" after they hear the entire case and then are 
abruptly dismissed, never becoming part of the decision-making 
process. 130 The longer the case, the more feelings of dissatisfaction 
occur among alternates whose time and mental energy investment is 
not rewarded by participation in the verdict. 131 These feelings of 
dissatisfaction can extend to the seated jurors who often develop a 
"team spirit" during a long trial and are negatively affected when a 
valuable member of the team is abruptly dismissed. 132 Additionally, 
there is concern that jurors identified as "alternates" may be less 
inclined to be attentive and alert during the trial because they do not 
expect to become seated jurors. 133 This poses a significant problem if 
these jurors eventually do become voting members of the jury. 
VI. FEDERAL REFORMS REGARDING ALTERNATE JURORS 
The federal criminal and civil systems have reconfigured their rules 
regarding alternate jurors to allow for greater flexibility when a 
seated juror becomes ill or incapacitated during deliberations. 134 
Although both the civil and criminal rules have recently changed, the 
differing court systems have approached the use of alternate jurors 
differently. 135 
in the event that a problem resulted and one of the seated jurors needed to be 
dismissed during deliberations. In that situation, one of the alternates would be ready 
to replace the juror and could become the sixth required juror. !d. 
129. See E-mail from Hon. Dennis Sweeney Jr., Chair of the Council on Jury Use and 
Management, to Author (Mar. 7, 2008, I 0: 13 EST) (on file with author). 
130. See Mary Kaluk Lanning, Comment, The Unnecessary Alternate Juror, 73 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 1047, !049 (2002). 
131. E-mail from Hon. Dennis Sweeney Jr., supra note 129. 
132. See id. 
133. See Timothy S. Robinson, A Judge Tries to Keep the Wallflowers Awake, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 25, 1980, at Cl. 
134. See generally FED. R. C!v. P. 48; FED. R. CR1M. P. 24(c) (providing for a jury of six to 
twelve members in civil trials and the appointment of alternate jurors in criminal 
trials). 
135. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. 
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A. Reforms to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure eliminated the concept of 
alternate jurors by the 1991 amendments to the rule. 136 Prior to these 
amendments, former Rule 4 7(b) enabled the federal district courts to 
impanel alternate jurors in an effort to "prevent mistrials in cases of 
long duration when a regular juror died, or became so ill that she was 
unable to continue her duties or otherwise became or was found to be 
disqualified, leaving the jury with fewer than twelve members."137 
Like the Maryland Rules, former Rule 4 7(b) allowed an alternate 
juror to replace a seated juror during trial but had a mandatory 
provision that required the dismissal of the alternates when the jury 
retired to consider its verdict. 138 
The abolishment of the concept of alternate jurors resulted from a 
number of factors. Former Rule 47(b) was based on the assumption 
that a jury must consist of exactly twelve members. 139 Operating 
under this assumption, alternate jurors were needed if one juror 
became unable to serve during the trial. 140 This assumption has 
subsequently been dismissed and now the minimum size of a jury in 
compliance with the U.S. Constitution is six members. 141 
Additional factors that led to the elimination of alternate jurors 
were the juror dissatisfaction and difficulties that resulted from the 
alternate juror process. 142 The former rule's requirements that 
alternate jurors sit through the entire trial but then be dismissed 
before becoming voting members of the jury was a source of 
dissatisfaction with the jury system. 143 The Advisory Committee 
recognized the burden the former rule placed on alternates "who are 
required to listen to the evidence but denied the satisfaction of 
participating in its evaluation." 144 Additionally, this provision led to 
increased confusion and even mistrials when district court judges, in 
violation of former Federal Rule 47(b), allowed alternates to be 
136. See 9B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2484 (3d ed. 2008). 
137. !d. 
138. !d. 
139. FED. R. Civ. P. 47 advisory committee's note (1991 amend.). 
140. Seeid. 
141. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 230-31 (1978) (holding that the constitutional 
right to a jury trial guarantees the right to have at least six jurors). 
142. See FED. R. Civ. P. 47 advisory committee's note (1991 amend.). 
143. See id. 
144. See id. 
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present in the jury room and substituted for seated jurors after the 
required dismissal. 145 
With the abolishment of alternate jurors, Rule 48 was heavily 
amended in 1991 to address situations where the use of alternate 
jurors would have been appropriate under the prior rules. 146 Under 
Rule 48, the court will now decide the exact number of jurors, which 
can range from six to twelve members. 147 Seating more than six 
jurors does not harm either party but rather "increases the 
representativeness of the jury." 148 
Judges can reduce the possibility of a mistrial by seating a jury of 
larger than six if they contemplate that the trial will be lengthy or 
complex. 149 If a juror needs to be excused during deliberations, a 
mistrial will not result, as it did formerly, because "a sufficient 
number will remain to render a unanimous verdict of six or more." 150 
All impanelled jurors participate in the verdict and "[n]o juror who 
endures to the end of the trial will be prevented from participating in 
the deliberations." 151 
B. Reforms to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Unlike the federal civil system, the federal criminal system has not 
eliminated alternate jurors altogether. 152 However, the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure regarding alternate jurors were changed in 
1983 and then again in 1999. 153 Particularly, the rules were amended 
to address the dilemma that results when a seated juror needs to be 
replaced during deliberations. 154 
145. See Hanson v. Darkside Surgery Ctr., 872 F.2d 745, 748-49 (6th Cir. 1989). 
146. See Matthews Lane, A Survey of the December 1991 Amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 59 TENN. L. REv. 367,394 (1992) (recognizing that Rule 48 
has been rewritten completely). 
147. See FED. R. Civ. P. 48. "A jury must initially have at least 6 and no more than 12 
members, and each juror must participate in the verdict unless excused under Rule 
47(c)." !d. 
148. See FED. R. Civ. P. 48 advisory committee's note (1991 amend.). If alternates are 
eliminated and more than six jurors are seated and return a verdict, greater community 
representation results. See Albert D. Brault, Jury Trial- How Many Jurors?, 37 MD. 
B.J. July-Aug. 2004, at 32, 37. 
149. See DavidS. Siegel, The Recent (Dec. 1, 1991) Changes in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 142 F.R.D. 359, 370 (1992). 
150. FED. R. Civ. P. 48 advisory committee's note (1991 amend.). 
151. Siegel, supra note 149, at 369. 
152. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c)(l). 
153. See Alison Markovitz, Note, Jury Secrecy During Deliberations, 110 YALE L.J. 1493, 
1516 (2001). 
154. See id. at 1495-96. 
220 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 38 
Prior to the 1999 amendments, Rule 24( c) mandated the dismissal 
of alternate jurors once the jury retired to deliberate, as an effort to 
protect the sanctity of jury deliberations. 155 The federal rules before 
the 1983 amendments did not provide for the jury to consist of fewer 
than twelve persons without the express consent of both parties. 156 
Thus, in the former federal criminal system, the illness or 
incapacitation of a juror during deliberations would inevitably result 
in a mistrial unless the parties consented to a verdict of less than 
twelve jurors. 157 
In an effort to provide courts a remedy other than declaring a 
mistrial, Rule 23(b )(3) was added in 1983. 158 This rule allows a jury 
of eleven to return a verdict, even without the agreement of both 
parties, if the court finds good cause to excuse a juror after the jury 
has retired to deliberate. 159 Good cause for excusing a juror is within 
the discretion of the trial court and generally involves juror sickness, 
family emergency, or juror misconduct. 160 
The 1983 Advisory Committee noted that there had been other 
proposals to amend the rules to allow for post-submission 
substitution of alternates after the jury retired to consider its 
verdict. 161 The Advisory Committee rejected these proposals in favor 
of proceeding with eleven jurors. 162 The committee was worried that 
permitting substitution of an alternate during deliberations would 
negatively affect the jury's group dynamic and compromise the 
privacy and secrecy of jury deliberations. 163 The rejection of post-
substitution proposals reaffirmed that alternates could not be 
substituted after the jury retired to consider its verdict. 164 
Despite the court's ability to proceed with eleven jurors, trial courts 
continued to misuse alternate jurors. 165 Judges largely formulated 
their own rules regarding alternate jurors, which involved 
155. Seeid.at1516. 
156. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1983 amends.). 
157. See Markovitz, supra note 153, at 1496. 
158. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b) advisory committee's note (1983 amends.). "It is the 
judgment of the Committee that when a juror is lost during deliberations . . . it is 
essential that there be available a course of action other than mistrial." !d. 
159. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b)(3). 
160. Murray v. Laborers Union Local No. 324, 55 F.3d 1445, 1452 (9th Cir. 1995). 
161. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 23 advisory committee's notes (1983 amends.). 
162. See id. 
163. See id. 
164. See id. 
165. See Jeffrey T. Baker, Criminal Law- Post-Submission Juror Substitution in the Third 
Circuit: Serving Judicial Economy While Undermining a Defendant's Rights to an 
Impartial Jury Under Rule 24(c), 41 VrLL. L. REv. 1213, 1214 (1996). 
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disregarding the mandatory discharge of alternates when the jury 
retires to consider its verdict. 166 Some courts allowed alternates to sit 
in on jury deliberations while others sequestered the alternate jurors 
during the course of deliberations. 167 Other courts not only violated 
the rules by not dismissing the alternates but also by substituting the 
alternates after the jury began deliberations. 168 
The actions of the federal trial courts forced the U.S. Supreme 
Court to examine the effect on the verdict when alternates are present 
in the deliberation room. 169 In United States v. Olano, 170 an alternate 
juror remained with the jury during the entirety of the 
deliberations. 171 The Court agreed that former Rule 24( c) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was violated, but the majority 
held that the presence of the alternates did not interfere with the 
jury's deliberations. 172 Essentially the Court adopted a harmless error 
test when alternates are present in the jury room and required the 
defendant to make an affirmative showing that he was prejudiced. 173 
After Olano, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were again 
amended in 1999 to provide greater flexibility for courts when jurors 
need to be replaced during deliberations. 174 The amendments aimed 
to provide clear guidance for lower courts regarding the substitution 
of alternate jurors, in expectation that trial courts would stop 
violating the rules. 175 The 1999 amendments repealed the mandatory 
dismissal of alternate jurors after the jury retires to consider its 
verdict and enabled courts to retain alternate jurors during the course 
of deliberations. 176 The retention of the alternates was intended to 
give the court more options in "long" and "costly" trials. 177 
166. See id. 
167. See id. at 1214-15. 
168. See id. at 1215. 
169. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 739 (1993). 
170. !d. 
171. !d. at 729. 
172. See id. at 739-40. 
173. See id. at 740-41. The Court of Appeals of Maryland declined to adopt the federal 
approach of "circumventing the rule through an expansive harmless error or 
presumptive non-prejudice doctrine .... " Hayes v. State, 355 Md. 615, 635, 735 A.2d 
1109, 1120 (1999). 
174. See Diane E. Courselle, Struggling with Deliberative Secrecy, Jury Independence, and 
Jury Reform, 57 S.C. L. REv. 203, 222 (2005). 
175. See id. 
176. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24 advisory committee's note (1999 amends.). 
177. See id. 
[T]he Committee believed that the court should have the 
discretion to decide whether to retain or discharge the alternates at 
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The option to retain alternates imposes additional responsibility on 
the courts to ensure that the sanctity of jury deliberations is not 
compromised. 178 These steps include instructing the retained jurors 
not to "discuss the case with anyone until" substituted or discharged, 
and separating the alternate jurors during deliberations. 179 
Additionally, the rule specifically requires that the court instruct the 
jury that deliberations must begin anew if the retained alternates are 
substituted. 180 This requirement "emphasizes the importance of 
ensuring that each member of a jury is a dynamic participant in the 
entire deliberation process." 181 
VII. MARYLAND'S PAST EFFORTS AT REFORM 
Like the federal courts, Maryland has recognized the shortcomings 
with its treatment of alternate jurors both in the civil and criminal 
sectors. 182 The numerous proposed reforms attempted to strike a 
balance between preventing unnecessary mistrials and preserving the 
sanctity of jury deliberations. 183 Unfortunately, unlike the federal 
courts, Maryland's efforts at reforming the alternate juror process 
have been unsuccessful. 184 
The suggested reforms to Maryland's treatment of alternate jurors 
are largely seen in the work of the Standing Committee on the Rules 
of Practice and Procedure. 185 Pursuant to the Maryland constitution, 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland regulates the practice, procedure, 
and judicial administration of the courts in the state. 186 As part of this 
authority, the court of appeals appoints a "standing committee of 
lawyers, judges, and other persons competent in judicial practice, 
procedure, or administration" to assist the court of appeals in this 
regulation. 187 The Standing Committee on the Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, referred to as the Rules Committee, meets monthly to 
/d. 
the time the jury retires to deliberate and to use Rule 23(b) to 
proceed with eleven jurors or to substitute a juror or jurors with 
alternate jurors who have not been discharged. 
178. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c)(3). 
179. /d.; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 24 advisory committee's note (1999 amends.). 
180. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c)(3). 
181. Markovitz, supra note 153,at 1517. 
182. See Brockington v. Grimstead, 176 Md. App. 327, 350-51, 933 A.2d 426, 439 (Ct. 
Spec. App. 2007), cert. granted, 403 Md. 304, 941 A.2d II 04 (2008). 
183. See id. at 350-51, 933 A.2d at 439. 
184. See id. 
185. See id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 186-226. 
186. MD. CONST. art. 4, § 18(a). 
187. Mo. CODE ANN., CTS. & Juo. PROC. § 13-301 (LexisNexis 2006). 
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consider amendments and additions to the Maryland Rules of 
Procedure and to propose recommendations for change to the court of 
appeals. 188 Not surprisingly, the Rules Committee's 
recommendations for reform have mirrored the changes to the 
Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure regarding alternate 
jurors. 189 The Rules Committee has sought to attain the same 
flexibility for Maryland that the federal criminal and civil systems 
have achieved when a seated juror needs to be replaced during the 
jury's deliberations. 190 
A. Reforms Based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
In May 2001, the Rules Committee debated and considered 
changes to the Maryland Rules that were modeled after Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure 47 and 48. 191 The proposed changes eliminated 
the concept of alternate jurors in the civil system, and required all 
jurors to deliberate and participate in the verdict. 192 This reform also 
involved amending the language of Maryland Rule 2-5ll(b) so that 
civil juries no longer must consist of six jurors, but would enable a 
civil jury to consist of no fewer than six jurors, identical to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 193 
The reforms that the Rules Committee considered in May 2001 
resulted from the recommendations of the Council on Jury Use and 
Management (CJUM). 194 The Conference of Circuit Judges created 
the CJUM in 1998 with much encouragement from Court of Appeals 
of Maryland's Chief Judge Robert Bell. 195 The primary purpose of 
the CJUM was to study Maryland's jury practices and problems and 
to make recommendations for areas of improvement. 196 It was 
188. Maryland Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 
http://www.courts.state.md.us/rules/index.html (last visited Aug 29, 2008). 
189. See FED. R. Clv. P. 48; Minutes of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, May 18, 2001, at 7-8, http://www.courts.state.md.us/rules/minutes/5-18-
0l.pdf [hereinafter May 18 Minutes]; see also FED. R. CR1M. P. 24(c). 
190. See May 18 Minutes, supra note 189, at 12. 
191. /d. 
192. !d. 
193. FED. R. Clv. P. 48; May 18 Minutes, supra note 189. 
194. See May 18 Minutes, supra note 189, at 2. 
195. Council on Jury Use and Management, 2000 Report and Recommendations I (2000), 
http://www.courts.state.md.us/juryrptl.pdf. 
196. See id. 
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anticipated that through the work of the CJUM, jury service could 
become more relevant and convenient for Maryland citizens. 197 
Reform of the alternate juror process was part of CWM's 
agenda. 198 The CWM analyzed the plight of alternate jurors and 
recognized the frustration that alternate jurors experience. 199 Not 
designating certain jurors as alternates in the civil system and 
requiring all impanelled jurors to deliberate would allow alternates to 
"remain involved in the process, deliberating and rendering a verdict 
rather than being abruptly cut off when the trial ends," which "allows 
[for] additional ideas and input from jurors, and makes alternates feel 
more connected to the process."200 The CWM's recommendations 
protect the court if one or two of the jurors become ill during 
deliberations because the trial judge is empowered to impanel more 
than six jurors. 201 As long as at least six jurors are still available to 
return the verdict, a mistrial need not be declared. 202 
The suggested reforms seemed like an ideal way to address both 
the problems of alternate juror dissatisfaction and mistrials, but the 
Rules Committee struggled with the CJUM's recommendations. 203 
Although the Maryland constitution provides that a civil jury must 
consist of"at least 6 jurors,"204 the Maryland Code (and the Maryland 
Rules) mandates that "the jury shall consist of six jurors."205 The 
Rules Committee concluded that because of the mandatory 
197. See id.; see also Chief Judge Robert M. Bell, State of the Judiciary Address (Jan. 23, 
2002), http://www.courts.state.md.us/soj2002.html. 
198. Council on Jury Use and Management, supra note 195, at 9. 
199. !d. 
200. Janet Stidman Eveleth, Court Considers Jury Reforms, Mo. B. BULL., Mar. 15, 2003, 
at 4, available at http://www.msba.org/departments/commpubl/publications/bar_bult/ 
2003 /march03/juryreform.htm (alteration in original). 
201. See May 18 Minutes, supra note 189, at 7. 
202. See id. 
203. See id. passim. 
204. Mo. CoNST., Declaration of Rights, art. 5(b). In 1991, the Conference of Circuit 
Judges proposed a legislative agenda to the Legislature that sought to change the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights to provide that a civil jury could consist of "at least 
six jurors." Brault, supra note 148, at 36. Maryland voters ratified the amendment in 
November 1992. !d. 
205. Mo. CODE ANN., Cts. & Juo. PROC. § 8-421 (LexisNexis 2006). In 1992, after the 
Maryland constitution was changed to allow for a civil jury of at least six jurors, there 
was a request for the Legislature to adopt a statute incorporating this change. Brault, 
supra note 148, at 36. That same year, the Maryland Legislature passed§ 8-306 (now 
§ 8-421) which mandated that civil juries consist of six jurors and explicitly declined 
to reconcile the requirements of the Maryland constitution with the Maryland Code. 
See id. "In interpreting the statute, Circuit Judges were advised that they had no 
authority to have more than six jurors decide a case." !d. 
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requirement in the Maryland Code,206 they could- not recommend a 
rule change to the court of appeals that would alter the six-person 
jury requirement and allow more than six jurors to be impanelled and 
participate in the verdict. 207 
The Rules Committee still supported the CJUM's 
recommendations and proposed to the legislature that it amend the 
Maryland statute to conform to the Maryland constitution. 208 This 
change would enable a civil jury to consist of "at least six" jurors so 
that impanelling more than six jurors and eliminating alternate jurors 
could be accomplished. 209 The court of appeals supported this 
legislative initiative and Chief Judge Bell regarded this reform as a 
way to avoid alternate juror dissatisfaction and reduce the possibility 
of future mistrials. 210 Legislation incorporating these reforms was 
introduced in three successive years but has not made it out of 
committee. m Kelly 0' Connor, legislative liaison for the House 
Judiciary Committee, explained to the Rules Committee that a 
majority of the House Judiciary Committee felt that there was not 
enough discontent with the alternate juror process to warrant a 
change in the law regarding the size of civil juries. 212 The Honorable 
Joseph C. Murphy, Jr., Chair of the Rules Committee, is still unclear 
about the exact reasons why the General Assembly rejected the 
proposed changes. 213 
206. Although there is also the mandatory requirement of six jurors in Md. Rule 2-511 (b), 
the Rules Committee has the power to recommend changes to these rules. See Brault, 
supra note 148, at 37. 
207. See May 18 Minutes, supra note 189, at 18. 
208. See id. at 18-19. 
209. Brault, supra note 148, at 36--37. 
210. Bell, supra note 197. 
211. See H.D. 614, 2004 Leg., 42lst Sess. (Md. 2004); H.D. 53, 2003 Leg., 420th Sess. 
(Md. 2003); H.D. 113, 2002 Leg., 419th Sess. (Md. 2002). The 2002 and 2003 
legislation, introduced by the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, sought to 
increase the size of the civil jury to at least six jurors. H. D. 53, 2003 Leg., 420th Sess. 
(Md. 2003); H.D. 113, 2002 Leg., 419th Sess. (Md. 2002). The legislation introduced 
in 2004, also sponsored by the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, allowed the 
court to impanel more than six but not more than nine jurors in a civil suit. H.D. 614, 
2004 Leg., 421 st Sess. (Md. 2004 ). The legislation proposing that a civil jury consist 
of more than six, but no more than nine, jurors is consistent with the current practice 
of the Superior Court for the District of Columbia. Brault, supra note 148, at 37. 
212. Minutes of the Standing Committee on the Rules of Practice and Procedure, Feb. 14, 
2003, at 1-2, http://www.courts.state.md.us/rules/minutes/02-14-03.pdf. 
213. E-mail from Hon. Joseph Murphy Jr., Chair of the Rules Committee, to Author (Feb. 
21, 2008, 11:25 CST) (on file with author). 
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B. Reforms Based on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Although the reforms to eliminate the concept of alternate jurors in 
the civil system failed because of a lack of cooperation from the 
legislature, 214 the Rules Committee formulated another set of reforms 
based on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure's 1999 
amendments. 215 In its 152nd Report to the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, the Rules Committee proposed changes to both Maryland 
Rule 2-512(b)216 and Maryland Rule 4-312(b)217 that allowed the 
court to retain alternate jurors after the jury retires to deliberate. 218 
Based on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c), the proposed 
changes required the court to ensure that retained alternates do not 
discuss the case with anyone and if an alternate does replace a seated 
juror, the court must instruct the jury to begin deliberations anew. 219 
The Reporter's Notes set forth in the Rules Committee's Report 
explained that the proposed amendments "reflect[ ed] a change in the 
policy underlying the current rule as enunciated in Hayes v. State."220 
Like the prior proposed reforms, these reforms originated as 
suggestions from the CJUM. 221 Although retaining the alternate 
jurors would have reduced the likelihood of declaring mistrials in 
both the civil and criminal trials, the court of appeals considered and 
rejected the amendments to both rules. 222 While the exact reason for 
the rejection is unknown, the Honorable Dennis Sweeney, Chair of 
the CJUM, reasoned that the Court of Appeals of Maryland might 
have preferred the bright line rule of discharging the alternate jurors 
when deliberations begin because it avoids judgment calls about what 
to do with the alternates if they are retained. 223 Judge Sweeney also 
explained that the court of appeals might have rejected the proposed 
reforms to prevent questions regarding when and how an alternate 
214. See id. 
215. Notice of Proposed Rule Changes, 152nd Report of the Standing Committee on Rules 
of Practice and Procedure, July 30, 2003, at 92, 
http://www .courts.state.md. us/rules/reports/ 152ndreport.pdf [hereinafter Notice]. 
216. Mo. R. 2-512(b) (current version at Mo. R. 2-512(t)(3)). 
217. Mo. R. 4-312(b) (current version at Mo. R. 4-312(t)(3)). 
218. See Notice, supra note 215, at 87-88, 93-94. 
219. !d. at 87-88, 92, 93-94. · 
220. !d. at 92. 
221. See id. 
222. See Brockington v. Grimstead, 176 Md. App. 327, 351, 933 A.2d 426, 439 (Ct. Spec. 
App. 2007). The court of appeals rejected the proposed rule changes on November 
12, 2003. /d. 
223. E-mail from Hon. Dennis Sweeney Jr., supra note 129. 
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can replace a seated juror and what instructions must be given when 
deliberations begin anew with the retained alternate. 224 
On January 1, 2008, changes took effect that reorganized the 
Maryland Rules regarding alternate jurors in both the criminal and 
civil arenas. 225 Although the Maryland Rules no longer have specific 
sections labeled "alternate jurors," the rules are essentially the same 
as before the changes. Unfortunately, the rules still require the 
mandatory dismissal of alternates when the jury retires to deliberate, 
so despite the organizational changes, Maryland's treatment of 
alternate jurors is still inadequate. 226 
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MARYLAND REFORM 
The Maryland Rules should be amended to eliminate the concept of 
alternate jurors altogether in the civil system. 227 This reform would 
require the cooperation of the Maryland General Assembly to change 
the Maryland Code, which mandates a jury of six. 228 This is a better 
alternative for the civil system, rather than retaining alternate jurors 
during deliberations, because it coincides with Maryland's 
commitment to preserving the sanctity of jury deliberations. 229 
Although retaining alternate jurors during deliberations is beneficial 
in reducing the possibility of mistrials, there have been concerns that 
retaining alternate jurors and then substituting them during the jury's 
deliberations could affect the dynamics of the jury.23° Furthermore, 
adopting the federal civil practice will increase the representiveness 
of the jury and best utilize the skills of all jurors, who undoubtedly 
have valuable insights to contribute to deliberations. 231 
Eliminating alternate jurors altogether and impanelling more than 
twelve jurors is not a possibility in the criminal system. Although 
224. See id. 
225. See MD. R. 2-512(b) (current version at MD. R. 2-512(f)(3)); MD. R. 4-312(b) (current 
version at MD. R. 4-312(f)(3)). 
226. See id. 
227. E-mail from Hon. Joseph Murphy Jr., supra note 213. Judge Murphy believes that at 
this point, adopting the federal rule for civil cases, which would allow alternate jurors 
to participate in deliberations as regular jurors, is the best option for reform. !d. 
228. See supra Part VI.A. 
229. See Stokes v. State, 379 Md. 618, 634 nn.4-5, 843 A.2d 64, 73 nn.4-5 (2004). 
230. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1983 amends.) (discussing the 
potential negative impact on group dynamics in the jury room when jurors are 
substituted after the start of deliberations). 
231. E-mail from Hon. Dennis Sweeney Jr., supra note 129. 
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juries of twelve are not expressly required by the U.S. Constitution,232 
both the Maryland Rules and the Maryland constitution require a jury 
of twelve unless the State and the defendant agree otherwise. 233 
Impanelling more than twelve jurors and requiring all of the 
impanelled jurors to participate and reach a unanimous verdict would 
require changes to the Maryland Rules and the Maryland constitution, 
which would be met with much resistance. However, retaining 
alternate jurors in criminal trials is still a viable option for reform that 
should be adopted. This option would still preserve the sanctity of 
jury deliberations because the alternate would not join the 
deliberations unless that alternate became a voting member of the 
jury.234 If the alternate is substituted, the trial judge must instruct the 
deliberations to begin anew. 235 
Despite the fact that the criminal and civil rules regarding alternate 
jurors are currently identical, there is no requirement that the two 
systems have to be the same. 236 The reforms ofthe Federal Civil and 
Criminal Rules of Procedure recognize that the two systems are 
different and the success of both reforms demonstrates that it can be 
beneficial to tailor change to the individual needs of each system. 237 
Whether Maryland chooses to eliminate the concept of alternate 
jurors altogether in the civil system or to retain alternate jurors after 
the jury retires to deliberate in both civil and criminal cases, either 
alternative would give the trial judge options when a juror cannot 
continue deliberations. These options would promote judicial 
economy not only by avoiding costly mistrials but by preventing 
appeals in cases such as Brockington. 238 Both alternatives also 
protect the sanctity of the jury deliberations, which Maryland has 
continually held is of the utmost concern. 239 
232. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). The Court ruled that the twelve juror 
requirement "appears to have been a historical accident," and that this requirement has 
not been "immutably codified" into the Constitution. See id. at 89-90, 102-03 nn.49-
50. However, the Court clarified that states were still at liberty to formulate their own 
jury size requirements. See id. at 103 n.50. 
233. See Stokes, 379 Md. at 627-28, 843 A.2d at 69. 
234. See supra Part VI.B. 
235. See supra Part VI.B. 
236. E-mail from Hon. Dennis Sweeney Jr., supra note 129. The Council on Jury Use and 
Management recommends different rules for criminal and civil cases. The CJUM has 
generally been supportive of adopting the federal civil and criminal practices because 
it would avoid a potential, unnecessary and wasteful mistrial while best utilizing the 
resources of alternate jurors who invest time and energy into the case. See id. 
237. See supra Part VIII. 
238. See supra Part liLA. 
239. See supra note 226 and accompanying text; see also supra Part VIII. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
Although there have been attempts to reform the alternate juror 
process for some time, 240 these failed attempts are of little solace to 
people like Joyce Grimstead whose lives are forever changed by 
Maryland's inability to effectively· utilize alternate jurors. The 
benefits of change are evident while the consequences of inaction are 
frightening. 241 The Maryland Legislature and the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland have an obligation to take action and reform the alternate 
juror system, as so many other jurisdictions have, to better address 
the needs of the judicial system and the needs of Maryland citizens. 
Andrea N. Silvestri 
240. See supra note 188 (showing the Standing Committee's reform suggestions); see also 
supra Part VI. 
241. See supra Part L 
